The Importance of Paper Check-In Rosters for Voter Privacy in Sherburne County A Position Paper by Michael Tonsager, Candidate for Sherburne County Auditor July 2026

As Sherburne County voters prepare to elect our next County Auditor, election integrity and public confidence in our voting systems remain paramount. Recent assessments by the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) highlight vulnerabilities in election technology—including electronic systems used at the polls—and the critical role of strong safeguards. One practical step to strengthen privacy and reduce unnecessary digital exposure is the use of traditional paper check-in rosters rather than electronic pollbooks.

CISA’s Key Findings on Vulnerabilities The CISA Election Report (As of July 13, 2026) provides a detailed, nonpartisan evaluation of U.S. election systems based on technical assessments conducted from 2019 to 2024. This report makes clear that election-related software and the networks that host it are subject to real security challenges:

“CISA’s findings highlight the reality that election-related software, like all complex software, contains vulnerabilities that require timely remediation… These limitations, combined with inconsistent vulnerability disclosure practices, result in election systems being deployed with known and unpatched security issues.”

Beyond software, the report repeatedly documents weaknesses in local networks:

“Election software is deployed into SLTT managed networks that frequently lack the defensive maturity assumed in vendor threat models… In multiple cases, CISA assessors gained full network control within hours or days…”

CISA specifically lists electronic pollbooks among the election systems that vendors assume are strongly segmented from general enterprise networks—yet assessments showed these systems are often reachable from ordinary IT environments due to shared authentication, weak firewall rules, and other common configuration issues. These findings underscore a central reality: every digital system introduced into the polling place expands the attack surface and creates potential pathways for unauthorized access to voter data.

Privacy Risks of Real-Time Electronic Check-In Systems Modern electronic pollbooks, such as the ones Sherburne County uses, KnowInk Poll Pad and its associated ePulse platform, are designed to deliver real-time monitoring capabilities. These systems can track voter turnout and check-in rates in near real-time, record average voter check-in times, monitor device status, enable remote locking or disabling of individual devices, support video or text communication with poll workers, and allow customizable live reporting and data transfer—including updates to voter rolls minutes before or during an election.

While these features can offer administrative convenience, they also mean that precise check-in times, participation patterns, and related voter information are captured digitally and may be transmitted or accessible centrally. In an environment where CISA has documented weak network segmentation and limited cybersecurity maturity in many local election offices, the collection and real-time transmission of this data introduce unnecessary privacy risks. Paper check-in rosters eliminate this digital footprint at the point of check-in, keeping sensitive timing and participation details offline and under local physical control.

Authority of the County Auditor Under Minnesota law, the county auditor is the head election official for state general elections and holds clear authority to designate the use of electronic rosters—or to choose not to use them. Minnesota Statutes § 201.225, subdivision 1, provides that the head election official for a county may designate that some or all precincts may use electronic rosters. The Minnesota Secretary of State has confirmed that the county auditor is this head election official, with supervisory authority over local officials for state general elections.

This authority allows the County Auditor to decide that precincts will use traditional paper check-in rosters. Doing so requires no new legislation and is fully consistent with existing state law. Municipalities and other local jurisdictions operate under the county auditor’s designation for state general elections; the auditor’s decision sets the standard that protects voter privacy across the county.

The Remedy: Prioritize Paper Check-In Rosters As County Auditor, I will exercise this statutory authority to prioritize paper check-in rosters at the polls. This approach will:

• Protect the privacy of individual check-in times and related voter information by keeping those details offline and free from real-time digital transmission or centralized monitoring.

• Reduce the digital attack surface at polling places, consistent with CISA’s documented concerns about network segmentation failures involving electronic pollbooks.

• Preserve the ability of local election judges to perform accurate, efficient voter verification while maintaining a simple, transparent, and auditable paper record of check-ins.

• Allow municipalities and precincts the option of paper systems under a clear county-level designation that prioritizes privacy and security.

These steps are achievable within current Minnesota law. They require only the leadership and judgment of the County Auditor to choose the method that best safeguards voter privacy.

Strengthening Trust in Sherburne County Elections The CISA Election Report makes clear that election systems face real challenges, and that every unnecessary digital component increases risk. Paper check-in rosters offer a straightforward, proven way to limit the exposure of sensitive check-in timing and participation data while still supporting accurate voter verification.

Voters deserve confidence that their participation details remain private and that polling-place systems are not creating avoidable digital pathways. By designating paper check-in rosters, Sherburne County can lead by example—moving from default reliance on electronic systems to a privacy-first approach grounded in both law and best practice.

I am committed to implementing this stronger safeguard if elected County Auditor. Protecting voter privacy at the point of check-in is not partisan—it is essential.

Michael Tonsager Candidate for Sherburne County Auditor

References Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). Election Report. As of July 13, 2026. Minnesota Statutes § 201.225, subdivision 1; Office of the Minnesota Secretary of State guidance on authority of the head election official to designate electronic rosters.